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Abstract Evidential reasoning is hard, and errors can lead to miscarriages of justice
with serious consequences. Analytic methods for the correct handling of evidence
come in different styles, typically focusing on one of three tools: arguments, sce-
narios or probabilities. Recent research used Bayesian networks for connecting
arguments, scenarios, and probabilities. Well-known issues with Bayesian networks
were encountered: More numbers are needed than are available, and there is a risk
of misinterpretation of the graph underlying the Bayesian network, for instance as a
causal model. The formalism presented here models presumptive arguments about
coherent hypotheses that are compared in terms of their strength. No choice is
needed between qualitative or quantitative analytic styles, since the formalism can
be interpreted with and without numbers. The formalism is applied to key concepts
in argumentative, scenario and probabilistic analyses of evidential reasoning, and is
illustrated with a fictional crime investigation example based on Alfred Hitchcock’s
film ‘To Catch A Thief’.
Keywords Evidential reasoning  Argumentation  Scenarios  Probabilistic
reasoning  Bayesian networks  Forensic science
1 Introduction
Establishing what has happened in a crime is often not a simple task. Many errors
can be made, with confirmation bias and statistical reasoning errors among the well-
documented sources of mistakes (cf. also Kahneman 2011). Recently the number of
erroneous convictions in criminal trials in the Netherlands was estimated to be in the
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order of 5–10% (Derksen 2016). As a result, there is a need for analytic tools that
can help prevent mistakes.
In the literature on correct evidential reasoning, three structured analytic tools are
distinguished: arguments, scenarios and probabilities (Anderson et al. 2005; Dawid
et al. 2011; Kaptein et al. 2009). These tools are aimed at helping organize and
structure the task of evidential reasoning, thereby supporting that good conclusions
are arrived at, and foreseeable mistakes are prevented.
In an argumentative analysis, a structured constellation of evidence, reasons and
hypotheses is considered. Typically the evidence gives rise to reasons for and
against the possible conclusions considered. An argumentative analysis helps the
handling of such conflicts. The early twentieth century evidence scholar John Henry
Wigmore is a pioneer of argumentative analyses; cf. his famous evidence charts
(Wigmore 1913).
In a scenario analysis, different hypothetical scenarios about what has happened
are considered side by side, and considered in light of the evidence. A scenario
analysis helps the coherent interpretation of all evidence. Scenario analyses were the
basis of legal psychology research about correct reasoning with evidence (Bennett
and Feldman 1981; Pennington and Hastie 1993; Wagenaar et al. 1993).
In a probabilistic analysis, it is made explicit how the probabilities of the
evidence and events are related. A probabilistic analysis emphasises the various
degrees of uncertainty encountered in evidential reasoning, ranging from very
uncertain to very certain. Probabilistic analyses of criminal evidence go back to
early forensic science in the late nineteenth century (Taroni et al. 1998) and have
become prominent by the statistics related to DNA profiling.
In a Netherlands-based research project,1 artificial intelligence techniques have
been used to study connections between these three tools (Verheij et al. 2016). This
has resulted in the following outcomes:
• A method to manually design a Bayesian network incorporating hypothetical
scenarios and the available evidence (Vlek 2016; Vlek et al. 2014);
• A case study testing the design method (Vlek 2016; Vlek et al. 2014);
• A method to generate a structured explanatory text of a Bayesian network
modeled according to this method (Vlek 2016; Vlek et al. 2016);
• An algorithm to extract argumentative information from a Bayesian network
modeling hypotheses and evidence (Timmer 2017; Timmer et al. 2017);
• A method to incorporate argument schemes in a Bayesian network (Timmer
2017; Timmer et al. 2015a).
Building on earlier work in this direction (Fenton et al. 2013; Hepler et al. 2007),
these results show that Bayesian networks can be used to model arguments and
structured hypotheses. Also two well-known issues encountered when using
Bayesian networks come to light:





• The graph model of a Bayesian network is formally well-defined, but there is the
risk of misinterpretation, for instance unwarranted causal interpretation (Dawid
2010) (see also Pearl 2009).
Research has started on addressing these issues by developing an argumentation
theory that connects presumptive arguments, coherent hypotheses and degrees of
uncertainty (Verheij 2014a, b; Verheij et al. 2016).
A key issue addressed in this paper is how to find an appropriate balance between
qualitative and quantitative modeling styles. Building on ideas presented semi-
formally by Verheij (2014b), in the present paper, a formalism is proposed in which
presumptive arguments about coherent hypotheses can be compared in terms of
their strengths. The formalism allows for a qualitative and a quantitative
interpretation. The qualitative interpretation uses total preorders, and the quanti-
tative interpretation probability distributions.
Key concepts used in argumentative, scenario and probabilistic analyses of
reasoning with evidence are discussed in terms of the proposed formalism. The idea
underlying this theoretical contribution is informally explained in the next
section. The crime story of Alfred Hitchcock’s famous film ‘To Catch A Thief’,
featuring Cary Grant and Grace Kelly (1955) is used as an illustration.
2 General idea
The argumentation theory developed in this paper considers arguments that can be
presumptive (also called ampliative), in the sense of logically going beyond their
premises. Against the background of classical logic, an argument from premises P
to conclusions Q goes beyond its premises when Q is not logically implied by P.
Many arguments used in practice are presumptive. For instance, the prosecution
may argue that a suspect was at the crime scene on the basis of a witness testimony.
The fact that the witness has testified as such does not logically imply the fact that
the suspect was at the crime scene. In particular, when the witness testimony is
intentionally false, based on inaccurate observations or inaccurately remembered,
the suspect may not have been at the crime scene at all. Denoting the witness
testimony by P and the suspect being at the crime scene as Q, the argument from P
to Q is presumptive since P does not logically imply Q. For presumptive arguments,
it is helpful to consider the case made by the argument, defined as the conjunction of
the premises and conclusions of the argument (Verheij 2010, 2012). The case made
by the argument from P to Q is P ^ Q, using the conjunction of classical logic. An
example of a non-presumptive argument goes from P ^ Q to Q. Here Q is logically
implied by P ^ Q. Presumptive arguments are often defeasible (Pollock 1987;
Toulmin 1958), in the sense that extending the premises may lead to the retraction
of conclusions.
In Fig. 1, on the left, we see an argument from premises P to conclusions Q. The
argument is attacked by a counterargument: the negation of Q, denoted :Q. The
case made by the argument from P to Q is P ^ Q. By considering the argument from
P to the case made P ^ Q, the argument’s presumptive character as going beyond
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the premises is emphasised (Fig. 1, middle). An argument from P to :Q makes the
case P ^ :Q. The two arguments from P to P ^ Q and to P ^ :Q are conflicting and
make mutually incompatible cases. When the argument from P to P ^ Q is stronger
than the argument to P ^ :Q, the conflict is resolved, and leads to the presumptive
conclusion Q. The relative strength is indicated in the figure using a[-sign. The
relative strength of these arguments corresponds to a comparative value of the two
cases P ^ Q and P ^ :Q being made, as suggested by the size of the corresponding
boxes in the figure (Fig. 1, right).
The three representations in the figure can each represent the information that Q
follows presumptively from P, but not when also :Q. On the left, this is indicated
by the argument from P to Q with counterargument :Q. In the middle, this is
indicated by the two presumptive arguments from P making the cases P ^ Q and
P ^ :Q, where the former argument is stronger. Assuming both P and :Q, there is
no conflict of arguments. On the right, this is indicated by considering that P follows
from both cases, but one has a stronger relative value. Assuming both P and :Q,
only one of the cases remains, viz. P ^ :Q. In a sense, P ^ Q represents the normal
case (given P) and P ^ :Q the exceptional one.
In Fig. 1, no numbers appear. The comparison of the arguments uses the ordering
relation associated with their relative strengths, indicated by the [-sign (in the
middle). Such an ordering relation can be derived from or interpreted in a numeric
representation. Figure 2 shows the numeric strengths s(P, Q) and sðP;:QÞ of the










Fig. 1 General idea: an argument with a counterargument (left); arguments for conflicting cases and their
comparison (middle); cases and their comparative value (right)
P ∧ Q P ∧ ¬Q
P
>s(P,Q) s(P,¬Q)




We discuss below that the numeric strengths s(P, Q) and sðP;:QÞ can be derived
from a probability function Pr, by treating strengths as conditional probabilities
PrðQ jPÞ and Prð:Q jPÞ. The comparison of the values of the corresponding cases
P ^ Q and P ^ :Q is equivalently derived from the comparison of PrðP ^ QÞ and
PrðP ^ :QÞ.
3 Formalism and properties
The formalism uses a classical logical language L generated from a set of
propositional constants in a standard way. We write : for negation, ^ for
conjunction, _ for disjunction, $ for equivalence, > for a tautology, and ? for a
contradiction. The associated classical, deductive, monotonic consequence relation
is denoted . We assume a finitely generated language, i.e., a language generated
using a finite set of propositional constants.
First we define case models, formalizing the idea of cases and their preferences.
Cases in a case model must be logically consistent, mutually incompatible and
different. Cases are logically consistent in the sense of the classical logical language
L. Cases are mutually incompatible, in the sense that the conjunction of case
sentences that are not logically equivalent, is inconsistent. Cases are different in the
sense that the set of case sentences cannot contain two elements that are logically
equivalent. The comparison relation must be total and transitive (hence is what is
called a total preorder, commonly modeling preference relations; Roberts 1985).
Definition 1 (Case models) A case model is a pair ðC; Þ, such that the following
hold, for all u, w and v 2 C:
1. 6 :u;
2. If 6 u$ w, then  :ðu ^ wÞ;
3. If  u$ w, then u ¼ w;
4. uw or wu ;
5. If uw and w v, then u v.
The strict weak order[ standardly associated with a total preorder  is defined as
u[w if and only if it is not the case that wu (for u and w 2 C). When u[w,
we say that u is (strictly) preferred to w. The associated equivalence relation  is
defined as uw if and only if uw and wu.
Example Figure 3 shows a case model with cases :P, P ^ Q and P ^ :Q. :P is




Fig. 3 Example of a case model
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Although the preference relations of case models are qualitative, they correspond to
the relations that can be represented by real-valued functions.
Corollary 1 Let C  L be finite with elements that are logically consistent,
mutually incompatible and different (properties 1, 2 and 3 in the definition of case
models). Then the following are equivalent:
1. ðC; Þ is a case model;
2.  is numerically representable, i.e., there is a real valued function v on C such
that for all u and w 2 C, uw if and only if vðuÞ vðwÞ.
The function v can be chosen with only positive values, or even with only positive
integer values.
Proof It is a standard result in order theory that total preorders on finite (or
countable) sets are the ones that are representable by a real-valued function (Roberts
1985). h
Corollary 2 Let C  L be non-empty and finite with elements that are logically
consistent, mutually incompatible and different (properties 1, 2 and 3 in the
definition of case models). Then the following are equivalent:
1. ðC; Þ is a case model;
2.  is numerically representable by a probability function Pr on the algebra
generated by C such that for all u and w 2 C, uw if and only if
PrðuÞ PrðwÞ.
Proof Pick a representing real-valued function v with only positive values as in the
previous corollary, and (for elements of C) define the values of Pr as those of v
divided by the sum of the v-values of all cases; then extend by summation to the
algebra generated by C. When C is non-empty, Pr is a probability function on the
algebra generated by C. h
Next we define arguments. Arguments are from premises u 2 L to conclusions
w 2 L.
Definition 2 (Arguments) An argument is a pair ðu;wÞ with u and w 2 L. The
sentence u expresses the argument’s premises, the sentence w its conclusions, and
the sentence u ^ w the case made by the argument. Generalizing, a sentence v 2 L
is a premise of the argument when u  v, a conclusion when w  v, and a position
in the case made by the argument when u ^ w  v. An argument ðu;wÞ is properly
presumptive when u 6 w; otherwise non-presumptive. An argument ðu;wÞ is a
presumption when  u, i.e., when its premises are logically tautologous.
Note our use of the plural for an argument’s premises, conclusions and positions.
This terminological convention can be slightly confusing initially, but has been
deliberately chosen since this allows us to speak of the premises p and :q and
conclusions r and :s of the argument ðp ^ :q; r ^ :sÞ. Also the convention fits our
132 B. Verheij
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non-syntactic definitions, where for instance an argument with premise v also has
logically equivalent sentences such as ::v as a premise.
Note that we define presumptions as a specific kind of argument, viz. from
tautologous premises, and not as propositions. We have done so in order to
emphasize that accepting a presumption is an inferential step that can be defeated.
In this way, presumptions differ from premises, which are the basis of possible
inferences, and not themselves the result of an inferential step. An example is the
presumption of innocence, which can be defeated by proof of guilt. (We formally
discuss this example at the start of Sect. 4.1.)
We define three kinds of valid arguments: coherent arguments, conclusive
arguments and presumptively valid arguments. A coherent argument is defined as an
argument that makes a case logically implied by a case in the case model. A
conclusive argument is a coherent argument, for which all cases in the case model
that imply the argument’s premises also imply the conclusions.
Definition 3 (Coherent and conclusive arguments) Let ðC; Þ be a case model.
Then we define, for all u and w 2 L:
ðC; Þ  ðu;wÞ if and only if 9x 2 C: x  u ^ w.
We then say that the argument from u to w is coherent with respect to the case
model. We define, for all u and w 2 L:
ðC; Þ  u) w if and only if 9x 2 C: x  u ^ w and 8x 2 C: if x  u, then
x  u ^ w.
We then say that the argument from u to w is conclusive with respect to the case
model.
Example (continued) In the case model of Fig. 3, the arguments from > to :P and
to P, and from P to Q and to :Q are coherent and not conclusive in the sense of this
definition. Denoting the case model as ðC; Þ, we have ðC; Þ  ð>;:PÞ,
ðC; Þ  ð>;PÞ, ðC; Þ  ðP;QÞ and ðC; Þ  ðP;:QÞ. The arguments from a
case (in the case model) to itself, such as from :P to :P, or from P ^ Q to P ^ Q are
conclusive. The argument ðP _ R;PÞ is also conclusive in this case model, since all
P _ R-cases are P-cases. Similarly, ðP _ R;P _ SÞ is conclusive.
The notion of presumptive validity considered here is based on the idea that some
arguments make a better case than other arguments from the same premises. More
precisely, an argument is presumptively valid if there is a case in the case model
implying the case made by the argument that is at least as preferred as all cases
implying the premises.
Definition 4 (Presumptively valid arguments) Let ðC; Þ be a case model. Then
we define, for all u and w 2 L:
ðC; Þ  u,w if and only if 9x 2 C:
1. x  u ^ w; and
2. 8x0 2 C: if x0  u, then xx0.
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We then say that the argument from u to w is presumptively valid with respect to the
case model. A presumptively valid argument is properly defeasible, when it is not
conclusive.
Example (continued) In the case model of Fig. 3, the arguments from > to :P,
and from P to Q are presumptively valid in the sense of this definition. Denoting the
case model as ðC; Þ, we have formally that ðC; Þ  >,:P and
ðC; Þ  P,Q. The coherent arguments from > to P and from P to :Q are
not presumptively valid in this sense.
Corollary 3
1. Conclusive arguments are coherent, but there are case models with a coherent,
yet inconclusive argument;
2. Conclusive arguments are presumptively valid, but there are case models with a
presumptively valid, yet inconclusive argument;
3. Presumptively valid arguments are coherent, but there are case models with a
coherent, yet presumptively invalid argument.
The next proposition provides key logical properties of this notion of
presumptive validity. Many have been studied for nonmonotonic inference relations
(Kraus et al. 1990; Makinson 1994; van Benthem 1984). Given a case model
ðC; Þ, we write u j w for ðC; Þ  u,w. We write CðuÞ for the set
fx 2 C jx  ug, and refer to the elements of CðuÞ as u-cases. For brevity, we
abbreviate ‘presumptively valid’ to ‘valid’.
(LE), for Logical Equivalence, expresses that in a valid argument premises and
conclusions can be replaced by a classical equivalent (in the sense of ).
(Cons), for Consistency, expresses that the conclusions of presumptively valid
arguments must be consistent.
(Ant), for Antecedence, expresses that when certain premises validly imply a
conclusion, the case made by the argument is also validly implied by these
premises.
(RW), for Right Weakening, expresses that when the premises validly imply a
composite conclusion also the intermediate conclusions are validly implied.
(CCM), for Conjunctive Cautious Monotony, expresses that the case made by a
valid argument is still validly implied when an intermediate conclusion is added to
the argument’s premises.
(CCT), for Conjunctive Cumulative Transitivity, is a variation of the related
Cumulative Transitivity property (CT, also known as Cut). (CT)—extensively
studied in the literature—has u j v instead of u j w ^ v as a consequent. The
variation is essential in our setting where the (And) property is absent (If u j w
and u j v, then u j w ^ v). Assuming (Ant), (CCT) expresses the validity of
chaining valid implication from u via the case made in the first step u ^ w to the




Proposition 1 Let ðC; Þ be a case model. For all u, w and v 2 L:
(LE) If u j w,  u$ u0 and  w$ w0, then u0 j w0.
(Cons) u 6j ?.
(Ant) If u j w, then u j u ^ w.
(RW) If u j w ^ v, then u j w.
(CCM) If u j w ^ v, then u ^ w j v.
(CCT) If u j w and u ^ w j v, then u j w ^ v.
Proof (LE): Direct from the definition. (Cons): Otherwise there would be an
inconsistent element of C, contradicting the definition of a case model. (Ant): When
u j w, there is an x with x  u ^ w that is  -maximal in CðuÞ. Then also
x  u ^ u ^ w, hence u j u ^ w. (RW): When u j w ^ v, there is an x 2 C with
x  u ^ w ^ v that is maximal in CðuÞ. Since then also x  u ^ w, we find u j w.
(CCM): By the assumption, we have an x 2 C with x  u ^ w ^ v that is maximal
in CðuÞ. Since Cðu ^ wÞ  CðuÞ, x is also maximal in Cðu ^ wÞ, and we find
u ^ w j v. (CCT): Assuming u j w, there is an x 2 C with x  u ^ w, maximal
in CðuÞ. Assuming also u ^ w j v, there is an x0 2 C with x  u ^ w ^ v,
maximal in Cðu ^ wÞ. Since x 2 Cðu ^ wÞ, we find x0 x. By transitivity of  ,
and the maximality of x in CðuÞ, we therefore have that x0 is maximal in CðuÞ. As
a result, u j w ^ v. h
We say that an argument ðu;wÞ has coherent premises when the argument ðu;uÞ
from the premises to themselves is coherent. The following proposition provides
some equivalent characterizations of coherent premises.
Proposition 2 Let ðC; Þ be a case model. The following are equivalent, for all
u 2 L:
1. u j u, i.e., the argument ðu;uÞ is presumptively valid;
2. 9x 2 C : x  u and 8x0 2 C: If x0  u, then xx0;
3. 9x 2 C : u j x.
4. 9x 2 C : x  u, i.e., the argument ðu;uÞ is coherent.
Proof 1 and 2 are equivalent by the definition of j . Assume 2. Then there is a  -
maximal element x of CðuÞ. By the definition of j , then u j x; proving 3.
Assume 3. Then there is a  -maximal element x0 of CðuÞ with x0  u ^ x. For
this x0 also x0  u, showing 2. 4 logically follows from 2. 4 implies 2 since L is a
language that generated by finitely many propositional constants. h
Corollary 4 Let ðC; Þ be a case model. Then all coherent arguments have
coherent premises and all presumptively valid arguments have coherent premises.
We saw that, in the present approach, premises are coherent when they are logically
implied by a case in the case model. As a result, generalisations of coherent
premises are again coherent; cf. the following corollary.
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Corollary 5 Let ðC; Þ be a case model. Then:
If u j u and u  w, then w j w.
We now consider some properties that use a subset L of the language L. The set
L consists of the logical combinations of the cases of the case model using
negation, conjunction and logical equivalence (cf. the algebra underlying proba-
bility functions (Roberts 1985)). L is the set of case expressions associated with a
case model.
(Coh), for Coherence, expresses that coherent premises correspond to a
consistent case expression implying the premises. (Ch), for Choice, expresses that,
given two coherent case expressions, at least one of three options follows validly:
the conjunction of the case expression, or the conjunction of one of them with the
negation of the other. (OC), for Ordered Choice, expresses that preferred choices
between case expressions are transitive. Here we say that a case expression is a
preferred choice over another, when the former follows validly from the disjunction
of both.
Definition 5 (Preferred cases) Let ðC; Þ be a case model, u 2 L, and x 2 C.
Then x expresses a preferred case of u if and only if u j x.
Proposition 3 Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and L  L the closure of C under
negation, conjunction and logical equivalence. Writing j  for the restriction of j
to L, we have, for all u, w and v 2 L:
(Coh) u j u if and only if 9u 2 L with u 6 ? and u  u;
(Ch) If u j u and w j w, then u _ w j :u ^ w or
u _ w j u ^ w or u _ w j u ^ :w;
(OC) If u _ w j u and w _ v j w, then u _ v j u.
Proof (Coh): By Proposition 2, u j u if and only if there is an x 2 C with
x  u. The property (Coh) follows since C  L and, for all consistent u 2 L,
there is an x 2 C with x  u: (Ch): Consider sentences u and w 2 L with u j u
and w j w. Then, by Corollary 5, u _ w j u _ w. By Proposition 2, there is an
x 2 C, with x  u _ w. The sentences u and w are elements of L, hence also the
sentences u ^ :w, u ^ w and :u ^ w 2 L. All are logically equivalent to
disjunctions of elements of C (possibly the empty disjunction, logically equivalent
to ?). Since x  u _ w,  u _ w$ ðu ^ :wÞ _ ðu ^ wÞ _ ð:u ^ wÞ, and the
elements of C are mutually incompatible, we have x  u ^ :w or x  u ^ w or
x  :u ^ w. By Proposition 2, it follows that u _ w j :u ^ w or u _ w j u ^ w
or u _ w j u ^ :w.
(OC): By u _ w j u, there is an x  u maximal in Cðu _ wÞ. By w _ v j w,
there is an x0  w maximal in Cðw _ vÞ. Since x  u, x 2 Cðu _ vÞ. Since
x0  w, x0 2 Cðu _ wÞ, hence xx0. Hence x is maximal in Cðu _ vÞ, hence
u _ v j u. Since v 2 L, u _ v j u. h
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The properties in Propositions 1 and 3 are the basis of qualitative and quantitative
representation results for the inference relation j . See Verheij (2016a), also for
other formal properties of the proposal. In Sect. 4.3, we show how the probabilistic
representation of case models (Corollary 2) gives rise to probabilistic representa-
tions of our three kinds of argument validity: coherence, conclusiveness, and
presumptive validity.
The history of research in Artificial Intelligence that combines arguments,
hypotheses and uncertainty is extensive and varied. Without claiming a represen-
tative selection, we mention a few examples in order to position the present
formalism. We already mentioned the work by Kraus et al. (1990) on a preferential
semantics for non-monotonic inference. Formal differences include that the present
proposal uses cases, not worlds as primitives in the semantics, and that the (And)-
rule (If u j w and u j v, then u j w ^ v.) does not hold for our notion of
presumptive validity. See Verheij (2016a) for further formal information. Non-
formal differences are that the present proposal is designed to be a balance between
qualitative and quantitative modeling, and has been applied to the modeling of
evidential reasoning (this paper) and normative reasoning (Verheij 2016c). Kohlas
et al. (1998) proposes a probabilistic approach to model-based diagnostics using
arguments supporting hypotheses about the state of a system. It is discussed that
numerical degrees of support can be looked at as conditional probabilities. Dung
and Thang (2010) defines probabilistic adaptations of abstract and assumption-based
argumentation. Hunter (2013) studies probability distributions in the settings of
abstract and logical argumentation, leading to an analysis of different kinds of
inconsistency that can arise. Benferhat et al. (2000) study non-monotonic reasoning
in terms of default reasoning, building on Adams’ epsilon semantics in terms of
extreme probabilities. Fagin and Halpern (1994) study reasoning about knowledge
and probability, studying a language that allows for the explicit mentioning of an
agent’s numeric probabilistic beliefs. Satoh (1990) studies non-monotonic reasoning
with a probabilistic semantics such that new information only leads to non-
monotonicity when it is contradicting previous information.
4 A formal analysis of some key concepts
We now use the formalism of case models and presumptive validity above for a
discussion of some key concepts associated with the argumentative, scenario and
probabilistic analysis of evidential reasoning.
4.1 Arguments
In an argumentative analysis, it is natural to classify arguments with respect to the
nature of the support their premises give their conclusions. We already defined non-
presumptive and presumptive arguments (Definition 2), and—with respect to a case
model—presumptively valid and properly defeasible arguments (Definition 4). We
illustrate these notions in an example about the presumption of innocence.
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Let inn denote that a suspect is innocent, and gui that he is guilty. Then the
argument ðinn;:guiÞ is properly presumptive, since inn 6 :gui. The argument
ðinn ^ :gui;:guiÞ is non-presumptive, since inn ^ :gui  :gui.
Presumptive validity and defeasibility are illustrated using a case model.
Consider the case model with two cases inn ^ :gui and :inn ^ gui ^ evi with
the first case preferred to the second (Fig. 4; the size of the cases’ rectangles
measures their preference). Here evi denotes evidence for the suspect’s guilt. Then
the properly presumptive argument ðinn;:guiÞ is presumptively valid with respect
to this case model since the conclusion :gui follows in the case inn ^ :gui that is
a preferred case of the premise inn. The argument is conclusive since there are no
other cases implying inn. The argument ð>; innÞ—in fact a presumption now that
its premises are tautologous—is presumptively valid since inn follows in the
preferred case inn ^ :gui. This shows that the example represents what is called
the presumption of innocence, when there is no evidence. This argument is properly
defeasible since in the other case of the argument’s premises the conclusion does not
follow. In fact, the argument ðevi; innÞ is not coherent since there is no case in
which both evi and inn follow. The argument ðevi; guiÞ is presumptively valid,
even conclusive.
In argumentative analyses, different kinds of argument attack are considered.
John Pollock made the famous distinction between two kinds of—what he called—
argument defeaters (Pollock 1987, 1995). A rebutting defeater is a reason for a
conclusion that is the opposite of the conclusion of the attacked argument, whereas
an undercutting defeater is a reason that attacks not the conclusion itself, but the
connection between reason and conclusion. Joseph Raz made a related famous
distinction of exclusionary reasons that always prevail, independent of the strength
of competing reasons (Raz 1990) (see also Richardson 2013).
Unlike in the work of Pollock, in the present proposal, undercutting and rebutting
attack are not treated as separate primitives. Instead they are specializations of a
general idea of attack defined in terms of case models. In this connection, Fig. 1 can
be confusing as the graphical representation of the argument and counterargument
(in the figure on the left) suggests that :Q attacks the connection between P and Q,
much like an undercutter. But the attack consists in the negation of the conclusion
Q of the argument from P, reminiscent of a rebutter. We show how the distinction
between undercutting and rebutting attack can still be made in the present proposal.
We propose the following terminology.
Definition 6 (Defeating circumstances) Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and ðu;wÞ a
presumptively valid argument. Then circumstances v are defeating or successfully
attacking when ðu ^ v;wÞ is not presumptively valid. Defeating circumstances are




rebutting when ðu ^ v;:wÞ is presumptively valid; otherwise they are undercutting.
Defeating circumstances are excluding when ðu ^ v;wÞ is not coherent.
Continuing the example of the case model illustrated in Fig. 4, we find the
following. The circumstances evi defeat the presumptively valid argument
ð>; innÞ since ðevi; innÞ is not presumptively valid. In fact, these circumstances
are excluding since ðevi; innÞ is not coherent. The circumstances are also rebutting
since the argument for the opposite conclusion ðevi;:innÞ is presumptively valid.
Note that this example of rebutting defeat is defeat of a presumption (in the sense of
Definition 2), hence can be regarded as a formalization of the idea of undermining
defeat that is the basis of argumentation formalisms in which defeat is assumption-
based (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Verheij 2003). See also the discussion of arguments
with prima facie assumptions by Eemeren et al. (2014).
Undercutting can be illustrated with an example about a lying witness. Consider a
case model with these two cases:
Case 1: sus ^ :mis ^ wit
Case 2: mis ^ wit
In the cases, there is a witness testimony (wit) that the suspect was at the crime
scene (sus). In Case 1, the witness was not misguided (:mis), in Case 2 he was. In
Case 1, the suspect was indeed at the crime scene; in Case 2, the witness was
misguided and it is unspecified whether the suspect was at the crime scene or not. In
the case model, Case 1 is preferred to Case 2 (Fig. 5), representing that witnesses
are usually not misguided.
Since Case 1 is a preferred case of wit, the argument ðwit; susÞ is presumptively
valid: the witness testimony provides a presumptively valid argument for the
suspect having been at the crime scene. The argument’s conclusion can be
strengthened to include that the witness was not misguided. Formally, this is
expressed by saying that ðwit; sus ^ :misÞ is a presumptively valid argument.
When the witness was misguided after all (mis), there are circumstances
defeating the argument ðwit; susÞ. This can be seen by considering that Case 2 is
the only case in which wit ^ mis follows, hence is preferred. Since sus does not
follow in Case 2, the argument ðwit ^ mis; susÞ is not presumptively valid. The
misguidedness is not rebutting, hence undercutting since ðwit ^ mis;:susÞ is not
presumptively valid. The misguidedness is excluding since the argument ðwit ^
mis; susÞ is not even coherent.
Arguments can typically be chained, namely when the conclusion of one is a
premise of another. For instance when there is evidence (evi) that a suspect is guilty
of a crime (gui), the suspect’s guilt can be the basis of punishing the suspect (pun).
For both steps there are typical defeating circumstances. The step from the evidence
Fig. 5 A case model for
undercutting
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to guilt is blocked when there is a solid alibi (ali), and the step from guilt to
punishing is blocked when there are grounds of justification (jus), such as force
majeure. Cf. Fig. 6.
A case model with three cases can illustrate such chaining:
Case 1: pun ^ gui ^ evi
Case 2: :pun ^ gui ^ evi ^ jus
Case 3: :gui ^ evi ^ ali
Cf. Fig. 7. In the case model, Case 1 is preferred to Case 2 and Case 3, modeling
that the evidence typically leads to guilt and punishing, unless there are grounds for
justification (Case 2) or there is an alibi (Case 3). Cases 2 and 3 are preferentially
equivalent.
In this case model, the following arguments are presumptively valid:
Argument 1 (presumptively valid): ðevi; guiÞ
Argument 2 (presumptively valid): ðgui; punÞ
Argument 3 (presumptively valid): ðevi; gui ^ punÞ
Arguments 1 and 3 are presumptively valid since Case 1 is the preferred case among
those in which evi follows (Cases 1, 2 and 3); Argument 2 is since Case 1 is the
preferred case among those in which gui follows (Cases 1 and 2). By chaining
arguments 1 and 2, the case for gui ^ pun can be based on the evidence evi as in
Argument 3.
The following arguments are not presumptively valid in this case model:
Fig. 6 Chained arguments
Fig. 7 Case model for chained arguments
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Argument 4 (not presumptively valid): ðevi ^ ali; guiÞ
Argument 5 (not presumptively valid): ðgui ^ jus; punÞ
This shows that Arguments 1 and 2 are defeated by circumstances ali and jus,
respectively:
Defeating circumstances 1 (attacking Argument 1): ali
Defeating circumstances 2 (attacking Argument 2): jus
The structural relations of the arguments 1 and 2 and their defeating circumstances 1
and 2 are graphically shown in Fig. 6.
As expected, chaining the arguments fails under both of these defeating
circumstances, as shown by the fact that these two arguments are not presumptively
valid:
Argument 6 (not presumptively valid): ðevi ^ ali; gui ^ punÞ
Argument 7 (not presumptively valid): ðevi ^ jus; gui ^ punÞ
But the first step of the chain—the step to guilt—can be made when there are
grounds for justification. Formally, this can be seen by the presumptive validity of
this argument:
Argument 8 (presumptively valid): ðevi ^ jus; guiÞ
This example shows how the preference ordering of cases is connected to the
overriding of arguments by their exceptions. Here we see that the exceptional cases
about grounds of justification and alibi are less preferred than Case 1. One could say
that because Case 1 is preferred the exceptional cases 2 and 3 are ignored given only
evi as a premise. The three arguments from evi to each of the cases separately are
coherent, but of these only the argument to Case 1 is presumptively valid. Since
Case 1 does not logically imply the defeating circumstances, adding ali or jus to
the premises makes Case 1 no longer coherently supported, hence certainly not
presumptively valid. Cf. Arguments 6 and 7, which make a case that logically
implies Case 1, but are not presumptively valid and not coherent.
4.2 Scenarios
In the literature on scenario analyses, several notions are used in order to analyze the
‘quality’ of the scenarios considered. Three notions are prominent: a scenario’s
consistency, a scenario’s plausibility and a scenario’s completeness (Pennington and
Hastie 1993; Wagenaar et al. 1993). In this literature, these notions are part of an
informally discussed theoretical background, having prompted work in AI & Law
on formalizing these notions (Bex 2011; Verheij and Bex 2009; Vlek et al. 2015). A
scenario is consistent when it does not contain contradictions. For instance, a
suspect cannot be both at home and at the crime scene. A scenario is plausible when
it fits commonsense knowledge about the world. For instance, in a murder scenario,
a victim’s death caused by a shooting seems a plausible possibility. A scenario is
complete when all relevant elements are in the scenario. For instance, a murder
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scenario requires a victim, an intention and premeditation. We now propose a
formal treatment of these notions using the formalism presented.
The consistency of a scenario could simply be taken to correspond to logical
consistency. A stronger notion of consistency uses the world knowledge represented
in a case model, and emphasises the coherence of a scenario in the sense of the
present formalism. In this way, we connect to the term coherence that also appears
in the literature on scenario-based evidence analysis, with various connotations.
In our proposal, some coherent scenarios fit the world knowledge represented in
the case model better than others, since some are presumptively valid. We can say
that a scenario is plausible (given a case model) when it is a presumptively valid
conclusion of the evidence. This notion of a scenario’s plausibility depends on the
evidence, in contrast with the mentioned literature (Pennington and Hastie 1993;
Wagenaar et al. 1993), where plausibility is treated as being independent from the
evidence. The present proposal includes an evidence-independent notion of
plausibility, by considering a scenario as plausible—independent of the evi-
dence—when it is plausible given no evidence, i.e., when the scenario is a
presumptively valid presumption. In the present setting, plausibility can be
connected to the preference ordering on cases given the evidence, when scenarios
are complete.
In the formal proposal here, besides coherence and presumptive validity, we have
encountered a third notion of validity: conclusiveness. This notion can be used to
represent that there is no remaining doubt about a scenario given the knowledge in
the case model: the scenario is beyond a reasonable doubt. Then the doubt that
always remains is transferred to doubt about whether everything that needs to be
considered is in the case model. When the case model is the result of a process of
critical, careful and open-minded scrutiny, and has been performed with appropriate
effort, such remaining doubt could be dubbed ‘unreasonable’ (Verheij 2014b).
We summarize the discussed definitions of coherence, completeness and
reasonable doubt, each in an evidence-independent and evidence-dependent variant.
Sentences r are intended to express scenarios, sentences  the evidence.
Definition 7 Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and r 2 L. Then we define:
1. r is coherent if and only if the argument ð>; rÞ is coherent;
2. r is plausible if and only if the argument ð>; rÞ is presumptively valid;
3. r is beyond a reasonable doubt if and only if the argument ð>; rÞ is conclusive.
Definition 8 Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and r and  2 L. Then we define:
1. r is coherent given  if and only if the argument ð; rÞ is coherent;
2. r is plausible given  if and only if the argument ð; rÞ is presumptively valid;




The completeness of a scenario can here be defined using a notion of maximally
specific conclusions, or extensions, as follows.
Definition 9 (Extensions) Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and ðu;wÞ a presumptively
valid argument. Then the case made by the argument (i.e., u ^ w) is an extension of
u when there is no presumptively valid argument from u that makes a case that is
logically more specific.
For instance, consider a case model in which the case vic ^ int ^ pre ^ evi is a
preferred case of evi. The case expresses a situation in which there is evidence
ðeviÞ for a typical murder: there is a victim ðvicÞ, there was the intention to kill
ðintÞ, and there was premeditation ðpreÞ. In such a case model, this case is an
extension of the evidence evi. A scenario can now be considered complete with
respect to certain evidence when the scenario conjoined with the evidence is its own
extension. In the example, the sentence vic ^ int ^ pre is a complete scenario
given evi as the scenario conjoined with the evidence is its own extension. The
sentence vic ^ int is not a complete scenario given evi, as the extension of
vic ^ int ^ evi also implies pre.
Definition 10 Let ðC; Þ be a case model, and r 2 L. Then we define:
r is complete given  if and only if r ^  is an extension of .
In the literature, scenario schemes have been used to represent a scenario’s
completeness (Bex 2011; Bex and Verheij 2013; Verheij et al. 2016; Vlek et al.
2014, 2016), taking inspiration from the use of scripts in artificial intelligence and
cognitive science (Schank and Abelson 1977). Here the cases in a case model are
used to represent completeness.
4.3 Probabilities
The literature on the probabilistic analysis of reasoning with evidence uses the
probability calculus as formal background. A key formula is the well-known Bayes’




Thinking of H as a hypothesis and E as evidence, here the posterior probability
PrðHjEÞ of the hypothesis given the evidence can be computed by multiplying the
prior probability PrðHÞ and the Bayes factor PrðEjHÞ= PrðEÞ.
A formula that is especially often encountered in the literature on evidential







Here the posterior odds PrðHjEÞ=Prð:HjEÞ of the hypothesis given the evidence is
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found by multiplying the prior odds PrðHÞ=Prð:HÞ with the likelihood ratio
PrðEjHÞ=PrðEj:HÞ. This formula is important since the likelihood ratio can
sometimes be estimated, for instance in the case of DNA evidence. In fact, it is a
key lesson in probabilistic approaches to evidential reasoning that the evidential
value of evidence, as measured by a likelihood ratio, does not by itself determine the
posterior probability of the hypothesis considered. As the formula shows, the prior
probability of the hypothesis is needed to determine the posterior probability given
the likelihood ratio. Just as Bayes’ theorem, the likelihood ratio obtains in a
probabilistic realization of a case model in our sense.
In Sects. 4.1 and 4.2, we focused on arguments and scenarios, which have
primarily (but not exclusively) been studied using qualitative methods. Here we
show that key notions of our approach can be given a quantitative, probabilistic
representation. In this way, we intend to show the balanced connection between
qualitative and quantitative analytic methods.
In particular, we turn to the quantitative representation of our three notions of
argument validity: coherence, conclusiveness and presumptive validity. We use the
probabilistic representation of case models as in Corollary 2 (Sect. 3). The
representing probability functions used there are functions on the algebra generated
by C. It is convenient to extend such functions to the language L.
Definition 11 Let ðC; Þ be a case model (with C non-empty) represented by a
probability function Pr as in Corollary 2. Then we define, for all u and w 2 L:
1. PrðuÞ :¼Px2C andxu PrðxÞ;
2. PrðwjuÞ :¼ Prðu ^ wÞ= PrðuÞ if PrðuÞ[ 0.
Note that the extension Pr to L only behaves exactly like the logical
generalization of a probability function when restricted to sentences corresponding
to the algebra generated by C. Consider for instance a language L generated by
propositional constants p and q and case model ðfpg; fðp; pÞgÞ represented by Pr.
Then PrðpÞ ¼ 1 and Prð:pÞ ¼ 0, as expected in a probabilistic setting where the
probabilities of complements add up to 1. However, PrðqÞ and Prð:qÞ are both equal
to 0.
Proposition 4 (Coherence, quantitative) Let ðC; Þ be a case model (with C non-
empty) represented by a probability function Pr as in Corollary 2. Then, for all u
and w 2 L, the following are equivalent:
1. ðC; Þ  ðu;wÞ;
2. Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0.
Proof Immediate using the definitions. An argument ðu;wÞ is coherent if and only
if there is a case x in C from which u ^ w, the case made by the argument, follows
logically. And, since Pr in Corollary 2 is positive on C, the definition of the
extension of Pr to L gives that this is the case if and only if Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0. h
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Proposition 5 (Conclusiveness, quantitative) Let ðC; Þ be a case model (with C
non-empty) represented by a probability function Pr as in Corollary 2. Then, for all
u and w 2 L, the following are equivalent:
1. ðC; Þ  u) w;
2. PrðwjuÞ ¼ 1.
Proof An argument ðu;wÞ is conclusive if and only if it is coherent and all u-cases
in C are also u ^ w-cases. This is the case if and only if Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0 and
Prðu ^ wÞ ¼ PrðuÞ. Since Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0 implies PrðuÞ[ 0, this is equivalent to
PrðwjuÞ ¼ 1. h
Proposition 6 (Presumptive validity, quantitative) Let ðC; Þ be a case model
(with C non-empty) represented by a probability function Pr as in Corollary 2. Then,
for all u and w 2 L, the following are equivalent:
1. ðC; Þ  u,w;
2. 9x 2 C:
(a) x  u ^ w; and
(b) 8x0 2 C : if x0  u, then PrðxÞ Prðx0Þ;
3. 9x 2 C:
(a) x  u ^ w; and
(a) 8x0 2 C : Prðx juÞ Prðx0 juÞ.
Proof An argument ðu;wÞ is presumptively valid if and only there is a u ^ w-case
x that is  -maximal among the u-cases in C. Hence the equivalence of 1 and 2.
Noting that x  u ^ w implies Prðu ^ wÞ[ 0, which implies PrðuÞ[ 0, which in
turn implies that Prðx0juÞ is defined for all x0 2 C, we find that 2 and 3 are also
equivalent.
The propositions show how the qualitatively defined notions of coherence,
conclusiveness and presumptive validity have equivalent quantitative characteriza-
tions. For presumptive validity, one is in terms of the comparative value of cases,
measured as a probability (part 2 of the proposition), the other in terms of the
comparative strength of arguments, measured as a conditional probability (part 3 of
the proposition).
We discuss an example, adapting our earlier treatment of the presumption of
innocence. Consider a crime case where two pieces of evidence are found, one after
another. In combination, they are considered to prove the suspect’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. For instance, one piece of evidence is a witness who claims to
have seen the suspect committing the crime (evi), and a second piece of evidence
is DNA evidence matching the suspect’s profile (evi’). The issue is whether the
Proof with and without probabilities 145
123
suspect is innocent (inn) or guilty (gui). Consider now a case model with four
cases:
Case 1: inn ^ :gui ^ :evi
Case 2: :inn ^ gui ^ evi ^ :evi’
Case 3: inn ^ :gui ^ evi ^ :evi’
Case 4: :inn ^ gui ^ evi ^ evi’
Case 1 expresses the situation when no evidence has been found, hence the
suspect is considered innocent and not guilty. In order to express that by default
there is no evidence concerning someone’s guilt, this case has highest preference.
Cases 2 and 3 express the situation that the first piece of evidence is found. Case 2
expresses guilt, Case 3 innocence, still considered a possibility given only the first
piece of evidence. In order to express that evi makes the suspect’s guilt more
plausible than his innocence, Case 2 has higher preference than Case 3. Case 4
represents the situation that both pieces of evidence are available, proving guilt. It
has lowest preference. Summarizing the preference relation we have:
Case 1[Case 2[Case 3[Case 4
Qualitatively, the following hold in this case model:
1. The argument ð>; innÞ for innocence given no evidence is coherent,
presumptively valid and not conclusive;
2. The argument ð>; guiÞ for guilt given no evidence is coherent, not presump-
tively valid and not conclusive;
3. The argument ðevi; innÞ for innocence given only the first piece of evidence is
coherent, not presumptively valid and not conclusive;
4. The argument ðevi; guiÞ for guilt given only the first piece of evidence is
coherent, presumptively valid and not conclusive;
5. The argument ðevi ^ evi0; innÞ for innocence given both the first and the
second piece of evidence is not coherent, not presumptively valid and not
conclusive.
6. The argument ðevi ^ evi0; guiÞ for guilt given both the first and the second
piece of evidence is coherent, presumptively valid and conclusive.
Table 1 Coherence and conclusiveness of the example’s arguments
Argument Coherence Conclusiveness
ð>; innÞ yes: PrðinnÞ[ 0 no: PrðinnÞ\1
ð>; guiÞ yes: PrðguiÞ[ 0 no: PrðguiÞ\1
ðevi; innÞ yes: Prðinn ^ eviÞ[ 0 no: PrðinnjeviÞ\1
ðevi; guiÞ yes: Prðgui ^ eviÞ[ 0 no: PrðguijeviÞ\1
ðevi ^ evi0; innÞ no: Prðinn ^ evi ^ evi0Þ ¼ 0 no: Prðinn j evi ^ evi0Þ\1
ðevi ^ evi0; guiÞ yes: Prðgui ^ evi ^ evi0Þ[ 0 yes: Prðgui j evi ^ evi0Þ ¼ 1
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In Tables 1 and 2, we translate these remarks to their quantitative versions using the
Propositions 4, 5, and 6. Here we assume that probability function Pr represents the
case model as in Corollary 2 and has been extended to a function on L as in the
propositions. As expected, the specific numbers used in Pr do not matter much. It is
mostly their relative sizes that count. For instance, we could use Pr with
PrðCase1Þ ¼ 0:4, PrðCase2Þ ¼ 0:3, PrðCase3Þ ¼ 0:2, and PrðCase4Þ ¼ 0:1. If
information about actual distributions for this example is available (for instance
about the proportion of possible suspects for which there is a witness, but no DNA
match), that can be reflected in Pr. Whichever representation Pr as in Corollary 2 is
chosen, the probability calculus is followed. Hence Bayes’ theorem and its odds
version using a likelihood ratio hold.
5 Example: Alfred Hitchcock’s ‘To Catch A Thief’
As an example of the development of evidential reasoning in which gradually
information is collected, we discuss the crime investigation story that is the
backbone of Alfred Hitchcock’s ‘To Catch A Thief’, otherwise—what Hitchcock
himself referred to as—a lightweight story about a French Riviera love affair,
starring Grace Kelly and Cary Grant. In the film, Grant plays a former robber Robie,
called ‘The Cat’ because of his spectacular robberies, involving the climbing of high
buildings. At the beginning of the film, new ‘The Cat’-like thefts have occurred.
Because of this resemblance with Robie’s style (the first evidence considered,
denoted in what follows as res), the police consider the hypothesis that Robie is
again the thief (rob), and also that he is not (:rob). Figure 8 provides a graphical
representation of the investigation. The first row shows the situation after the first
evidence res, mentioned on the left side of the figure, with the two hypothetical
conclusions rob and :rob represented as rectangles. The size of a rectangle’s area
suggests the strength of the argument from the accumulated evidence to the
hypothesis. Here the arguments from res to rob and :rob are of comparable
strength.
When the police confront Robie with the new thefts, he escapes with the goal to
catch the real thief. By this second evidence (esc), the hypothesis rob becomes
more strongly supported than its opposite :rob. In the figure, the second row
indicates the situation after the two pieces of evidence are available. As indicated by
Table 2 Presumptive validity of the example’s arguments
Argument Presumptive validity
ð>; innÞ yes: PrðCase1Þ[ PrðCase2Þ[ PrðCase3Þ[ PrðCase4Þ
ð>; guiÞ no: PrðCase2Þ\ PrðCase1Þ; PrðCase4Þ\ PrðCase1Þ
ðevi; innÞ no: PrðCase3 j eviÞ\ PrðCase2 j eviÞ
ðevi; guiÞ yes: PrðCase2 j eviÞ[ PrðCase3 j eviÞ[ PrðCase4 j eviÞ
ðevi ^ evi0; innÞ no: The argument is not coherent
ðevi ^ evi0; guiÞ yes: PrðCase4jevi ^ evi0Þ ¼ 1
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the rectangles of differently sized areas, the argument from the accumulated
evidence res ^ esc to rob is stronger than that from the same premises to :rob.
Rectangles in a column in the figure represent corresponding hypotheses. Sentences
shown in a corresponding hypothesis in a higher row are not repeated. So on the
second row, when the evidence res and esc are taken into account, the rectangles
correspond to rob (on the left) and :rob (on the right).
Robie sets a trap for the real thief, resulting in a night-time fight on the roof with
Foussard who falls and dies (fgt). The police consider this strong evidence for the
hypothesis that Foussard is the thief (fou), but not conclusive so also the opposite
hypothesis is considered coherent (:fou). In the figure (third row marked fgt) the
hypothesis :rob is split into two hypotheses: one rectangle representing
:rob ^ fou, the other :rob ^:fou, both in conjunction with the evidence
available at this stage of the investigation (res ^ esc ^ fgt). With the
accumulated evidence res ^ esc ^ fgt as premises, the hypothesis
:rob ^ fou is more strongly supported than the hypothesis :rob ^:fou. The
police no longer believe that Robie is the thief. This is indicated by the line on the
left of the third row in the figure. The premises res ^ esc ^ fgt do not provide
support for the hypothesis rob; or, in the terminology of this paper: the argument
from premises res ^ esc ^ fgt to conclusion rob is not coherent.
Fig. 8 Example: Hitchcock’s ‘To Catch A Thief’
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Robie points out that Foussard cannot be the new incarnation of ‘The Cat’, as he
had a prosthetic wooden leg (pro). In other words, the argument from
res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro to :rob ^ fou is not coherent. (Cf. the second line
in the fourth row of the figure, corresponding to the hypothesis that Foussard is the
thief.)
Later in the film, Foussard’s daughter is caught in the act (cau), providing very
strong support for the hypothesis that the daughter is the new cat (dau). The
argument from res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau to dau is stronger than to
:dau.
In her confession (con), Foussard’s daughter explains where the jewelry stolen
earlier can be found, adding some specific information to the circumstances of her
crimes (jwl). The argument from res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con to
dau ^ jwl is stronger than to :dau ^:jwl.
The police find the jewelry at the indicated place (fin) and there is no remaining
doubt about the hypothesis that Foussard’s daughter is the thief. The argument from
res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con ^ fin to :dau ^:jwl is incoherent, as
indicated by the line on the right of the bottom row of the figure. In the only remaining
hypothesis, Foussard’s daughter is the thief, and not Robie, and not Foussard. In other
words, the argument from res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con ^ jwl to
:rob ^:fou ^ dau is conclusive.
During the investigation, gradually a case model has been developed representing
the arguments discussed in the example. We distinguish 7 cases, as follows:
Case 1: rob
^ res ^ esc
Case 2: :rob ^ fou
^ res ^ esc ^ fgt
Case 3: :rob ^:fou ^ dau ^ jwl
^ res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con ^ fin
Case 4: :rob ^:fou ^:dau ^:jwl
^ res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con
Case 5: :rob
^ res ^:esc
Case 6: :rob ^:fou
^ res ^ esc ^:fgt
Case 7: :rob ^:fou ^:dau
^ res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^:cau
Cases 1–4 are found as follows. First the properties of the four main hypotheses are
accumulated from the columns in Fig. 8:
Hypothesis 1: rob
Hypothesis 2: :rob ^ fou
Hypothesis 3: :rob ^:fou ^ dau ^ jwl
Hypothesis 4: :rob ^:fou ^:dau ^:jwl
Then these are conjoined with the maximally specific accumulated evidence that
provide a coherent argument for them:







res ^ esc ^ fgt
Evidence coherent with
hypothesis 3:
res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con ^ fin
Evidence coherent with
hypothesis 4:
res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con
Cases 5–7 complete the case model. Case 5 is the hypothetical case that Robie is not
the thief, that there is resemblance, and the Robie does not escape. In Case 6, Robie
and Foussard are not the thieves, and there is no fight. In Case 7, Robie, Foussard
and his daughter are not the thieves, and she is not caught in the act. Note that the
cases are consistent and mutually exclusive.
Figure 9 shows the 7 cases of the model. The sizes of the rectangles represent the
preferences. The preference relation has the following equivalence classes, ordered
from least preferred to most preferred:
1. Cases 4 and 7;
2. Case 3;
3. Case 6;
4. Cases 2 and 5;
5. Case 1.
Note that the rectangles in Fig. 8 can be constructed as combinations of the
rectangles in Fig. 9.
The discussion of the arguments, their coherence, conclusiveness and validity
presented semi-formally above fits this case model. For instance, the argument from
the evidential premises res ^ esc to the hypothesis rob is presumptively valid in
this case model since Case 1 is the only case implying the case made by the argument.
It is not conclusive since also the argument from these same premises to :rob is
coherent. The latter argument is not presumptively valid since all :rob-cases
implying the premises (Cases 2–7) have lower preference than Case 1. The argument
from res ^ esc ^ fgt to rob is incoherent as there is no case in which the
premises and the conclusion follow. Also arguments that do not start from evidential
premises can be evaluated. For instance, the argument from the premise (not itself
evidence)dau tojwl is conclusive since in the only case implying the premises (Case
3) the conclusion follows. Finally we find the conclusive argument from premises
res ^ esc ^ fgt ^ pro ^ cau ^ con ^ jwl to conclusion :rob ^:fou ^
dau ^ jwl (only Case 3 implies the premises), hence also to dau.




In this paper, we have discussed correct reasoning with evidence using three
analytic tools: arguments, scenarios and probabilities. We proposed a formalism in
which the presumptive validity of arguments is defined in terms of case models, and
studied properties (Sect. 3). In particular, we showed that the qualitative definitions
of case models and presumptive validity have a quantitative representation in terms
of probability functions. We discussed key concepts in the argumentative, scenario
and probabilistic analysis of reasoning with evidence in terms of the formalism
(Sect. 4). An example of the gradual development of evidential reasoning was
provided in Sect. 5.
This work builds on a growing literature aiming to formally connect the three
analytic tools of arguments, scenarios and probabilities. In a discussion of the
anchored narratives theory by Crombag et al. (1993), it was shown how
argumentative notions were relevant in their scenario analyses (Verheij 2000).
Bex has provided a hybrid model connecting arguments and scenarios (Bex 2011;
Bex et al. 2010), and has worked on the further integration of the two tools (Bex
2015; Bex and Verheij 2013). Connections between arguments and probabilities
have been studied by Hepler et al. (2007) combining object-oriented modeling and
Bayesian networks. Fenton et al. (2013) continued this work by developing
representational idioms for the modeling of evidential reasoning in Bayesian
networks. Inspired by this research, Vlek developed scenario idioms for the design
of evidential Bayesian networks containing scenarios (Vlek et al. 2014), and
Timmer showed how argumentative information can be extracted from a Bayesian
network (Timmer et al. 2015b). Keppens and Schafer (2006) studied the knowl-
edge-based generation of hypothetical scenarios for reasoning with evidence, later
developed further in a decision support system (Shen et al. 2006).
This paper continues from an integrated perspective on arguments, scenarios and
probabilities (Verheij 2014b). In the present paper, that integrated perspective is
formally developed (building on ideas in Verheij 2014a) using case models and
discussing key concepts used in argumentative, scenario and probabilistic analyses.
Interestingly, our case models and their preferences are qualitative in nature, while the
preferences correspond exactly to those that can be numerically and probabilistically
realized. As such, the present formal tools combine a non-numeric and numeric
perspective (cf. the paper ‘To Catch A Thief With and Without Numbers’; Verheij
2014b). The mathematics of the formalism is studied further in Verheij (2016a) and has
been applied to value-guided decision making in Verheij (2016c).
The present work does not require modeling evidential reasoning in terms of full
probability functions, as is the case in Bayesian network approaches. In this way,
the well-known problem of needing to specify more numbers than are reasonably
available is addressed. In fact, we have shown an approach in which the specific
numbers of a quantitative representation can be abstracted to a qualitative
representation. Also whereas the causal interpretation of Bayesian networks is
risky (Dawid 2010), our case models come with formal definitions of arguments,
their coherence, conclusiveness and presumptive validity.
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From a knowledge representation perspective, one relevant question is what
happens in more complex examples than the ones used here. Indeed, more realistic
examples can quickly increase in complexity and may lead to more cases than can
be handled. This question has not been addressed in this paper. A helpful next step
could be to perform a case study of a real example, but also the formal investigation
of the growth of complexity can prove fruitful.
Another knowledge representation issue is where the case models come from. In
the formal proposal in this paper, the evaluation of arguments and scenarios happens
against the background of a given case model. So such evaluation requires that a
case model is available. No systematic approach for the development of case models
is discussed in this paper. For the Bayesian network modeling of scenarios, Vlek
et al. (2014) provides such a method, and Timmer et al. (2015a) discusses the
inclusion of argumentation schemes and their critical questions in a Bayesian
network model. These works continue from the use of building blocks and idioms
for building a Bayesian network model of the evidence in a criminal case, pioneered
by Hepler et al. (2007) and Fenton et al. (2013). Perhaps ideas from these
systematic modeling approaches can be adapted to the present setting.
By the present and related studies, we see a gradual clarification of how
arguments, scenarios and probabilities all have their specific useful place in the
analysis of evidential reasoning. By explicating formal bridges between qualitative
and quantitative analytic styles, we have provided an explanation why some prefer
to rationally analyze proof numerically, and others non-numerically. As a result, it
seems ever less natural to choose between the three kinds of tools, and ever more so
to use each of them when practically applicable.
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